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n a surprising volte face at his meeting in Moscow with President Putin on September 3rd, 
President  Serzh  Sargsyan  of  Armenia  agreed  to  join  the  Russian-dominated  customs 
union with Kazakhstan and Belarus. Thus, in one short meeting, he scrapped the draft 
Association Agreement with the EU, which included a ‘Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade 
Agreement’ (DCFTA), whose negotiation over the past three years had advanced to the point 
that its initialling was firmly scheduled for the Eastern Partnership summit in Vilnius in 
November. And, at the same time, the Armenian President chose to deprive his country of 
the possibility to enter into free trade area agreements with other states, which any economy 
is  free  to  do  unless  it  is  part  of  a  customs  union,  in  which  case  it  becomes  bound  to  a 
common external tariff.  
This latter deprivation is particularly serious in Armenia’s case, since Russia’s external tariff 
is on average rather highly protective. In the process, Sargsyan has also precluded Armenia 
from pursuing the only plausible strategy to become an open, highly-skilled, small economy, 
following for example the model of Israel, with which it shares several features in common. 
More broadly, it is worth noting that most of the world’s top-ten economies by GDP per 
capita, from Luxembourg to Singapore, are small but completely open countries.  
The  economic  case  against  joining  the  Russian  customs  union  is  all  the  greater  because 
nothing in the DCFTA with the EU would have prevented Armenia from entering into a 
‘high-quality’, free trade agreement1 with the Russian-led customs union. Armenia is already 
party to the matrix of CIS free trade agreements, but many of these do not function well. 
Rather than join the Belarus, Kazakhstan and Russia customs union, why should Armenia 
not simply negotiate a high-quality free trade agreement with it?  
President Sargsyan has offered two main explanations for his baffling behaviour: Armenia 
depends on Russia to guarantee its security and its large diaspora in Russia make it natural 
for the two countries to have a close economic relationship. One might challenge the first 
explanation by noting that no other collective security arrangement, e.g. NATO, requires its 
member states to join a customs union led by the principal nation.  
                                                   
1 ‘High quality’ means free trade with no exceptions. The concept is now explicitly developed in South-East Asia 
by some ASEAN countries with New Zealand, and forms a core principle of the newly emerging Trans-Pacific 
Partnership (TPP).  
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As regards the Armenian diaspora in Russia, their remittances are indeed important to the 
Armenian  economy  and  will  remain  so  until  it  becomes  dynamic  enough  to  induce  its 
émigrés to return home. During the period of very tense Russian-Georgian relations before 
their  2008  war,  discriminatory  measures  were  employed  by  the  Russian  police  against 
Georgians in Russia. Armenia is vitally concerned that its people are not similarly mistreated 
in Russia. But again, the linkage with the Russia-led customs union is entirely gratuitous and 
logically unnecessary. For example, both Norway and Switzerland are completely integrated 
into  the  EU’s  labour  market  and  there  is  the  free  movement  of  people  throughout  the 
European Economic Area. But the EU sees no need to put pressure on these countries to join 
its customs union, and both Norway and Switzerland are free to pursue their own trade 
policies with third countries.  
Russian control of gas imports to Armenia may be a further explanatory factor in President 
Sargsyan’s decision. He will surely have observed how Russia uses energy supplies as an 
instrument of coercive foreign policy in both Ukraine and Moldova.  
There are other recent developments that may shed light on Russia’s behaviour towards 
Armenia. On August 13th President Putin made his first visit to Baku in many years, which 
resulted in contracts for the supply of Russian military hardware to Azerbaijan, amounting 
to $4 billion. Azerbaijan itself is greatly expanding its military spending on the basis of its oil 
and gas revenues and one frequently discerns in the country’s political discourse a strong 
determination  to  get  the  settlement  it  wants  over  Nagorno-Karabakh,  preferably  by 
negotiation, but if necessary, by force. Meanwhile Russia has a military base in Armenia. 
Thus Russia is conspicuously arming Armenia’s enemy while at the same time pressuring it 
to  join  the  customs  union.  The precise  terms  of  the  Sargsyan-Putin  conversation  on  this 
matter are not publicly known but left to the imagination. 
On the other hand, there are perceptions in Armenia that the EU, while deepening its civil 
cooperation with Armenia through the Eastern Partnership, has done precious little to ease 
the country’s vulnerable geo-political and geo-economic situation. For example, it has urged 
Armenia to close its nuclear power station without offering alternative energy solutions. And 
it has had no perceptible influence over Azerbaijan with a view to resolving the Nagorno-
Karabakh conflict or over Turkey on the issue of opening the Armenian-Turkish border for 
normal transport links. 
But  this  Armenian  story  is  only  a  part  of  a  grander  Russian  campaign  to  also  dissuade 
Ukraine  and Moldova  from signing  their  DCFTAs  with  the  EU.  Russia  has  a  long  track 
record of using pseudo technical barriers to trade as instruments of political pressure. On 
September  11th,  Russia  changed  tactics  from  threat  to  action  by  banning  all  imports  of 
Moldovan  wine.  Overnight  Russian  officials  transformed  what  had  been  an  enjoyable 
alcoholic beverage into a “health hazard” for the entire Russian population. Georgia has 
suffered  similar  actions  against  its  wine  and  sparkling  waters  at  various  times  in  recent 
years. Currently Ukraine, which routinely is targeted with long customs delays, has been hit 
with the latest bijou of Russian trade diplomacy: Ukrainian chocolates have suddenly been 
declared  a  “health  hazard”  for  the  whole  of  the  Russian-Kazakh-Belarus  customs  union! 
Such actions are contestable at the WTO unless the justification for them is transparent and 
scientifically  proven,  which signals  another problem:  Russia may  think  that  it,  as  a  new 
member of the WTO, can overrule the rules whenever it has a political interest to do so. .  
Moreover, the status of the customs union itself is still uncertain. It cannot be recognised by 
the WTO or brought under WTO rules since Kazakhstan and Belarus are not yet members of 
the WTO. Kazakhstan is negotiating accession, but whether it accepts Russia’s WTO-bound 
tariffs as its own is not yet clear. It has signalled that it would like to revise these rates 
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WTO member, is considering joining the customs union, but this would mean raising its 
WTO-bound tariffs and thereby entail  compensating third countries, which it can hardly 
afford. More profoundly for Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and other Central Asian republics, it 
would mean serious tariff barriers with their even-larger neighbour, China, thus certainly 
causing an increase in the cost of living, since Russia is not a competitive supplier of the 
goods they import from China. While for the EU’s Eastern partners the optimum formula is 
to have high-quality free trade with both the EU and Russia, for the Central Asian states 
there is the equivalent case for free trade with both Russia and China, or at least as liberal 
trade with China as they feel is in their best interests.   
President Putin is thus doing all he can to expand his customs union with coercive measures, 
denying the economic interests of the targeted states for more open economic relationships 
with the rest of the world, and with the EU in particular. Kazakhstan, while a founding 
member of the customs union, resents the high level of Russian tariffs it was forced to adopt. 
In short, a triple disaster is in the making on the European continent: destruction of the EU’s 
benign  neighbourhood  policy,  poisoning  of  Russia-EU  relations  and  construction  of  a 
disastrous  Russian  neighbourhood  policy.  Why  disastrous?  For  the  EU  and  EU-Russia 
relations, it is obvious enough. But how might it harm Armenia, or Moldova or Ukraine? 
Because the Russian strategy is built on two fatal foundations: first, it would cut off the new 
member of the customs union from the freedom to develop an open competitive economy in 
the  21st  century’s  world  of  globalisation,  and second,  it  would  have  been  built  on  crude 
hegemonic  geo-political  coercion.  In  combination,  they  are  a  recipe  for  resentment  and 
ultimately failure.  
Georgia was thought to have been sufficiently immunised against Russian pressures to join 
the Russian-led customs union. Recently, however, Prime Minister Bidzina Ivanashvili has 
created some confusion by saying that he would consider whether the customs union would 
be  in  Georgia’s  interests.  This  would  mean  overturning  the  country’s  fundamental 
achievement of becoming completely economically open to the whole world. His remarks, 
however, were quickly followed by official statements that Georgia’s European and Western 
priorities were not in question. It seems that the Prime Minister was addressing some would-
be diplomatic remarks towards Russia, which were reported out of context and should not 
be over-interpreted. 
What can be done? On September 11th, Commissioner Stefan Füle voiced his concerns before 
the  European  Parliament  acknowledging  “enormous pressure  being  brought  to  bear”  on 
some  of  the  EU’s  Eastern  partners.  The  Commissioner  declared:  “Let  me  be  clear:  the 
development of the Eurasian Economic Union project must respect our partners' sovereign 
decisions. Any threats from Russia linked to the possible signing of agreements with the 
European  Union  are  unacceptable.”  These  include  citing  the  misuse  of  energy  prices, 
artificial  trade  obstacles,  military  cooperation  and  security  guarantees  and  the 
instrumentalisation  of  protracted  conflicts  as  unacceptable  (see  “Commissioner  Füle 
statement to EP Plenary on the pressure exercised by Russia on countries of the Eastern 
Partnership”, 11/09/2013 (http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-13-687_en.htm).  
The  EU  now  needs  to  follow  up  its  statement  by  intensifying  its  support  for  Armenia, 
Moldova, Ukraine and Georgia with a strong information campaign. It needs to explain why 
the Russian strategy is so dangerous, addressing these arguments to all democratic forces, 
both  political  parties  and  civil  society,  within  the  partner  states,  and  notably  within 
Armenian society.  
The EU has already started preparations to help Moldova overcome the Russian ban of its 
wines. In his remarks to the European Parliament, Commissioner Füle reported that he and 4 | EMERSON & KOSTANYAN 
 
the Commissioner for Agriculture “intend to look into the possibility of being able to further 
increase the wine quota for Moldovan exports to the EU”. 
These multiple disasters could be avoided, with benefits to all parties. Russia could expand 
the reach of its new customs union by entering into high-quality free trade agreements with 
the states that want also to have DCFTAs with the EU. In addition, Russia and the EU could 
open discussions over a free trade agreement between the customs union and the EU itself. 
These steps would be worthy of such expressions as our common European home, where the 
aim should be the establishment of a common economic space from ‘Lisbon to Vladivostok’ 
(Putin’s  idea).  Russia  should  be  willing  to  make  a  concordat  with  the  EU,  best  starting 
tomorrow, to develop mutually supportive and non-coercive policies towards their common 
neighbours,  rather  than  insist  on  playing  19th  century  zero-sum  games  of  geo-political 
competition, forcing a choice upon our neighbours who would like good relations with both 
EU and Russia.  
What has to be hammered home to those unsure of the economic arguments is that you do 
not have to have an exclusive customs union to enjoy deep integration for goods, services, 
people and capital, and of course even less for hard security relationships. High-quality free 
trade agreements are the logical instrument for those who want excellent relations with more 
than one big neighbour.  